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DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT-1975
Although 1975 marked the ninth year since the enactment of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOA),1 the Act, as in previous years,
continued to be the source of much litigation and the subject of signifi-
cant judicial interpretation.2 This litigation was in part the product of
new questions raised by the recent amendments to the FOIA which took
effect in 1975.3 Yet a number of issues not at all related to the
amendments received judicial attention as well. Of major importance in
this regard were three Supreme Court decisions in which the Court re-
solved for the first time several areas of uncertainty, as its general ap-
proach to the proper construction of the Act began to crystallize.
The 1975 litigation under the FOIA focused on a wide range of
specific questions. First, the courts again addressed the recurring issue
of whether traditional equity powers are available to courts enforcing the
Act. In addition, the mandate to disclose "final opinions ' 4 and its
relationship to the exemptions received attention by the Supreme Court
in two of its three decisions. Finally, three of the Act's nine exemptions
were the subject of significant judicial interpretation: the intra-agency
memorandum exemption, 5 the statutory exemption,' and the newly
amended investigatory records exemption. 7 The purpose of this Note is
to describe these developments and attempt to evaluate their impact in
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FOIA DEVELOPMENTS
terms of the underlying policy of the FOIA which favors the disclosure
of information acquired by the federal government.
POWER OF THE COURTS UNDER TIM FOIA
A recurring issue in FOIA litigation is to what extent traditional
equity powers are available to the courts for the enforcement of the
Act.' Two particular questions arising from that issue were the subject
of FOIA litigation in 1975: (1) whether courts have the power to
enjoin administrative proceedings pending the ultimate resolution of an
FOIA claim, and (2) whether courts have the equitable power to refuse
to order disclosure of material which is not otherwise exempt under the
Act.
Power to Enjoin Ongoing Agency Proceedings
The FOIA does not expressly grant courts the power to enjoin
administrative proceedings pending a decision on the merits of a related
FOIA action.9 Nevertheless, courts have generally been willing in
appropriate cases to imply such equitable power,'0 and those courts
which faced the issue in 1975 continued to support this position. In
General Cigar Co. v. Nash,'- General Cigar sought from the National
Labor Relations Board certain statements by witnesses taken by the
Board in its prosecution of an unfair labor practice complaint against
the company. Also requested was a preliminary injunction enjoining
the Board from hearing the case pending final adjudication of the FOIA
claim.' 2 Though refusing to issue the injunction, the court recognized
that such relief would have been appropriate if the company had been
able to establish that it would have suffered irreparable injury absent an
injunction.' 3 The question was also addressed by a single judge of the
8. See FOJA Developments 417-42.
9. See Renegotiation Dd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1974).
10. See id. at 19-20 (dictum); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91,'
93 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per duriam), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950 (1974); Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
See also FOIA Developments 419-21 (arguing that Bannercraft "suggests that, in a
proper case, an FOIA court may enjoin other ongoing administrative proceedings.").
11. 36 AD. L.2D 1073 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. Id. "[A] preliminary injunction is an injunction that is issued to protect a
plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the court's power to render a meaningful
decision after a trial on the merits." 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
AN PRoca nua § 2947 (1973). It is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Id.
13. 36 AD. L.2D at 1073-74. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
12, § 2948 ("Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is a showing of irreparable harm.").
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Seventh Circuit in Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC,14 where the
corporation, a respondent in a pending FTC proceeding, asked the court
to enjoin the proceeding until it "had an adequate opportunity to pursue
[its] remedies" under the FOIA.15 Although the court again denied
the motion, reasoning that to go forward with the administrative pro-
ceeding would not "irreparably foreclose the possibility of adequate
relief,"' 6 its approach to the question makes clear its assumption that it
had the power to grant injunctive relief.
Both General Cigar and Encyclopedia Britannica suggest that
courts do possess the equitable power to enjoin administrative proceed-
ings pending the outcome of an FOIA action. Yet those same cases
also make clear that courts will not readily find that the moving party
has made the requisite showing of irreparable injury, and thus will
seldom grant such relief. The policy reason for this reluctance is a
relatively straightforward one: "there is a significant public interest in
permitting litigation to go forward on an orderly basis and in avoiding
delays and interruptions to orderly procedure . . . . Thus, at least
where an FOIA plaintiff has not yet demonstrated a right to specific
documents, he is not likely to be able to enjoin concurrent administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of his FOIA litigation.
A somewhat different situation arises when the FOIA plaintiff,
after obtaining relief, asks the court to enjoin an administrative proceed-
ing until the agency complies with the court's order to produce the
documents sought.' 8 A request of this type was made in Title Guaran-
14. 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975).
15. Id. at 1014. The corporation sought access to an FTC document in a district
court suit. The court assumed for purposes of analysis that the plaintiff would be able to
establish its right to the documents sought and that the documents themselves could be
shown to have "materially and adversely affected" the plaintiff's rights to "a fair and
impartial hearing before the Commission." Id.
16. Id. The court pointed out that any FTC order could be set aside by a court, and
that alternatively a court could order supplementary administrative proceedings "to avoid
injustice to any party." Id. See 11 C. WRiGHT & A. MrLLER, supra note 12, § 2948
(preliminary injunctions are usually denied where there are adequate alternate remedies).
17. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 1975).
See generally 11 C. WArGHT & A. MiLLER, supra note 12, § 2947 ("the preliminary
injunction is appropriate whenever the policy of preserving the court's power to decide
the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an interim restraint before it has
done so.").
18. Insofar as the direct enforcement of the FOIA is concerned, the statute provides
only that a court has jurisdiction to enjoin the withholding of information and to order
production of items it finds must be disclosed, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp.
1976), and that a court may punish noncompliance with its order by holding the persons
responsible in contempt. Id. § 552(a) (4) (G). Nowhere does the Act expressly provide
that a court has the power to enjoin agency proceedings until the agency obeys the
court's disclosure order. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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tee Co. v. NLRB,19 where the company, which had been charged by the
NLRB with an unfair labor practice, asked the court to enjoin the Board
from conducting hearings until the Board complied with the court's
order to turn over certain material relevant to those hearings. 20 After
concluding that it did have the power to grant such relief,21 and finding
that "the nature of an unfair labor practice proceeding is such that
plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the material is not disclosed prior
to those hearings," the court enjoined the Board "from conducting any
hearings in this matter until such time as it compiles with this deci-
sion."22
The result reached by the court in Title Guarantee on the issue of
irreparable injury should be contrasted with that reached in General
Cigar.2 3 In both cases the FOIA plaintiff sought to enjoin an NLRB
unfair labor practice hearing until it had a chance to examine certain
statements by witnesses in the possession of the Board. Finding poten-
tial irreparable injury to the plaintiff, the court in Title Guarantee
granted the injunction, while the court in General Cigar reached the
opposite conclusion. The only real difference between the cases is that
the plaintiff in the former had already demonstrated his right to the
documents, whereas in the latter the plaintiff sought the injunction
pending proof of the FOIA claim. This difference is hardly sufficient
to distinguish the cases on the question of irreparable harm. So long as
the General Cigar plaintiff could prove some chance of ultimately
succeeding on the merits, he would be at precisely the same disadvan-
tage in the unfair labor practice hearing as would a plaintiff who had
already established a right to material under the FOIA, but who did not
have the benefit of that material at the hearing due to the recalcitrance
of the agency.
It is suggested, however, that the cases are reconcilable, for if one
looks beneath the irreparable harm language employed by both courts, it
is possible to detect a broader concern. Not only does it appear that
the courts take into account the extent to which the plaintiff may be in-
jured if an injunction is not issued, but they also consider the extent to
19. 37 AD. L2n 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
20. Id. at 686.
21. Id. at 688. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's dictum in
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974), that "[w]ith the
express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by § 552(a) there is little to
suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent
powers of an equity court." Id. at 20.
22. Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 37 AD. L.2D 685, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
23. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
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which an injunction will disrupt the administrative process and whether
the remedy will promote the disclosure goals of the Act. There are thus
three policy reasons which arguably might persuade a court to grant an
injunction to a plaintiff who has already demonstrated his right to gov-
ernment information under the FOIA while refusing to issue that injunc-
tion to a similarly situated plaintiff who has not yet won his FOIA claim.
First, a plaintiff who has won on the merits is not likely to be using the
FOIA injunction merely to delay the orderly administrative process.
Second, granting an injunction to the successful FOIA litigant may be
viewed as a direct means of promoting one goal of the Act-to get the
information into the public domain while the public has some use for
it.24 If the administrative hearing to which the information is relevant is
conducted after a court has ordered disclosure but before the material is
made available to the plaintiff, he has won a pyrrhic victory indeed.
Finally, issuing an injunction only after it has been settled that the FOIA
requires disclosure of the information in question ensures that any delay
of the administrative process will be the fault of the agency itself. The
sooner it produces the documents over which it has control, the sooner it
can conduct its business.
Discretion to Refuse to Compel Disclosure of Non-exempt Information
A related and perhaps more important question which arises under
the FOIA is whether a court has equitable discretion to refuse to compel
disclosure of non-exempt information. At least one distinguished com-
mentator 25 and several courts28 have indicated that such equitable dis-
cretion does exist, relying on some of the language in the Act itself and
certain parts of its legislative history.2  The majority of the courts
which have considered the matter, however, have declined to find
equitable discretion to refuse to compel disclosure of non-exempt infor-
mation.28  These courts also rely upon the language of the Act29 and
24. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
25. K. DAvis, ADMmNiSTmTwE LAw TREATISE § 3A.6 (Supp. 1970). Professor Davis
relies on the language in the statute which gives the district court "jurisdiction to enjoin"
an agency from withholding information. See note 27 infra. In his view "the word
'enjoin' is enough to invoke the traditions of equity. And an equity court by its intrinsic
nature has a discretionary power to refuse to participate in bringing about results that
are inconsistent with sound equitable practice." Id.
26. See FO1A Developments 424 n.35 and cases cited therein.
27. The support for this interpretation is discussed in id. 424-25 & nn.36-37.
The language in the FOIA itself on which the courts have relied provides that
"Coln complaint, the district court .. . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding records. . . ." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (4) (B) (Supp. 1976).
28. See FOIA Developments 425 n.38; Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 Mici. L REv. 971, 1151 (1975).
29. "This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availa-
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parts of the legislative history."0 The Supreme Court has not directly
faced the issue, although there is a dictum in Renegotiation Board v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co.31 which, if read broadly, could be taken to
sanction such equitable discretion. Specifically, the Court stated that
"there is nothing [in the FOIA] to suggest . . . that Congress sought to
limit the inherent powers of an equity court."32
In Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS,"3 the only 1975 case to address the
question, the government, relying on Bannercraft, asked the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's decision to order
release of non-exempt information. 4 The court, however, refused to
interpret the Bannercraft dictum broadly. Rather, it distinguished Ban-
nercraft as dealing with the issue of whether a court has equitable
discretion to grant additional remedies (for instance, injunctions against
ongoing administrative proceedings) in order to effectuate the purposes
of the Act, and not as involving the question of whether a court has
discretion to withhold relief otherwise mandated by the Act.35  The
Fruehauf court found the legislative history of the Act demonstrative of
a clear intent to preclude the exercise of the latter equitable power.36
Almost unquestionably the court reached the correct result. The
FOIA is a mandate for disclosure, and contains only narrow exceptions.
If it is to have the effect of making access to government information an
orderly, reasonably predictable, and less arbitrary process, the grounds
for nondisclosure must be confined to those situations expressly enumer-
ated in the Act. Only in this manner will the statute realize its potential
bility of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c) (1970); FOIA Developments 425 n.39.
30. FOIA Developments 425 n.40. These courts "conclude that in enacting the
FOLA Congress itself has already weighed the merits of disclosure and has found secrecy
appropriate only in the nine specifically exempt categories .... [A] court's equity
powers should not be used to create new exemptions for otherwise non-exempt material."
Id. at 425.
31. 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974); cf. FOIA Developments 424.
32. 415 U.S. at 20.
33. 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975).
34. Id. at 286. The documents sought were mostly "unpublished private and letter
rulings relating to the manufacturers' excise tax as imposed upon sales of trucks and
trailers." Id. The case was before the circuit court on an appeal by the government
from an order that the documents be made available without deletion subject to in
camera review by the district court. Id.
35. Id. at 291 n.5.
36. Id. at 291, citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) ("It is the
purpose of the present bill ... to establish a general philosophy of full agency dis-
closure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language
Vol. 1976:366]
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to create an atmosphere in which disclosure of government information
without endless litigation is the norm and not, as it has been, the
exception.3 7
FINAL OPINIONs: A LIMITATION ON THE
SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTIONS
An important issue which received Supreme Court attention in
1975 is whether the affirmative disclosure provisions of the FOIA38
limit the scope of the exemptions.3 9 Since the Act explicitly states that
the affirmative disclosure provisions do not apply to material which falls
within any of the enumerated exemptions, 40 one might conclude that
once an exemption is found to apply, the affirmative disclosure provi-
sions become irrelevant.4' It might also be argued, however; that given
the vague language of most of the exemptions, the limitations on their
scope are necessarily provided in part by both legislative history and the
rest of the Act. If one assumes that the affirmative disclosure provi-
sions and the exemptions are mutually exclusive, then the fact that a
particular document has characteristics of both categories may lead to
the conclusion that the congressional intent was to exclude such a docu-
ment altogether from the scope of the exemption. 42
37. It should be noted, however, that courts do not always opt for a narrow
construction of the exemptions. Indeed, in its analysis of the statutory exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1970), the Supreme Court construed the exemption in such a way
as to leave the application of that exemption in the virtually unrestrained discretion of
any agency which can invoke a broad withholding statute. FAA Administrator v. Rob-
ertson, 95 S. Ct. 2140 (1975). For a full discussion of the case and the statutory
exemption see notes 166-87 infra and accompanying text.
By analogy to Robertson, where the Court refused to find a repeal by implication of
existing withholding statutes in the absence of an explicit congressional authorization,
the Court might find that the FOIA did not divest the courts of their traditional equity
power by implication. The analogy, however, is a weak one because in Robertson the
Court refused to find another statute repealed by implication, whereas in the case of
divesting the courts of a part of their equity powers, no express congressional grant of
those powers exists.
38. E.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (2) (A) (Supp. 1976) "Each agency ... shall make
available for public inspection and copying - .. final opinions . . . made in the
adjudication of cases .... "
39. Id. §§ 552(b)(l)-(9).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970): "This section [section 552] does not apply to matters
that are [specifically enumerated in the exemptions]."
41. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 n.21 (1975) ('Technical-
ly ... if a document could be ... both a 'final opinion' and an intra-agency
memorandum within Exemption 5, it would be nondisclosable, since the Act 'does not
apply' to documents falling within any of the exemptions.").
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970); Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1059. See
note 41 supra.
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The Supreme Court addressed this general issue in two separate
contexts in 1975. First, the Court was called on to delineate the
relationship between the exemption for intra-agency memoranda4 3 and
the Act's mandate that "[e]ach agency . . . shall make available for
public inspection and copying final opinions. . . made in the adjudica-
tion of cases."' 4" Second, it addressed the question whether the express
incorporation of an otherwise exempt document into such a "final
opinion" removes the document from exempt status.
It is by no means clear from the face of the FOIA how a court
should treat a document that is a "final opinion"45 under the Act, and
thus must be disclosed, but that also arguably qualifies under exemption
5,46 which excludes from the Act's disclosure provisions "intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
. .. in litigation with the agency." As noted above, a literal
reading of the statute suggests that the requirement to disclose final
opinions simply does not apply to material which falls within the exemp-
tion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,47 adopting the analysis used by the lower courts which had
previously considered the question,48 found that the express mandate to
disclose "final opinions" does indeed limit the scope of the intra-agency
memorandum exemption. In this case, Sears argued that the NLRB
was required to disclose the documents in question since they were
"expressions of legal and policy decisions already adopted by the agency
and constitute[d] 'final opinions' and 'instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public.'- 49  The NLRB, on the other hand, contended
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
44. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (2) (A) (Supp. 1976).
45. Id.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
47. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). Other aspects of Sears are discussed at notes 69-81, 100-
126 infra and accompanying text.
48. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (relying on
policy of the Act to prevent the development of secret law); American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Intra-Agency Memorandum
Exemption 1059-61 (arguing that an "adopted policy" limitation to the intra-agency
memorandum exemption is consistent with the policies underlying that exemption).
49. 421 U.S. at 137, quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (2) (A), (C). Sears had requested
certain Advice and Appeals Memoranda generated by the Office of the General Counsel
of the NLRB during the process by which that office determined whether to file a
complaint with the full Board on behalf of the charging party. 421 U.S. at 135-36. In
order to have a complaint heard before the full NLRB, an aggrieved party must first
bring his charge before the Office of General Counsel, to which Congress has delegated
the unreviewable authority to determine whether a complaint will be filed. 29
U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(b) (1970). In most instances the General Counsel has delegated
the power to make the initial determination whether to issue a complaint to a Regional
Vol. 1976:366]
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that even if the documents were "final opinions," they still fell within
the intra-agency memorandum exemption. 0 Rejecting the NLRB's
argument, the Court found that "[e]xemption 5 does not apply to any
document which falls within the meaning of the phrase 'final opinion
. . .made in the adjudication of cases' . "..."51 In other words, once
it has been determined that a particular document is a "final opinion,"
the document must be released regardless of the fact that it also argua-
bly qualifies as an intra-agency memorandum.52
The Court's interpretation seems entirely supportable. Given the
ambiguities of the intra-agency memorandum exemption, it is quite
sensible to look to other sections of the Act in order to define its scope.
In essence what the Court did was to balance the ultimate goal of the
FOIA, which is reflected in the mandate to disclose "final opinions,"
against the interests which the exemption was. intended to protect and
the damage which might result to those interests should the documents
in question be disclosed. The Court justified its interpretation by
looking to the policy behind the intra-agency memorandum exemp-
tion.518 Since final opinions are essentially post-decisional documents,
Director. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1975). After an investigation, id. § 101.4, if the charge
has no merit the Regional Director will so inform the complainant. Id. § 101.5. The
complainant then has the right to appeal to the General Counsel. Id. § 101.6. The
General Counsel reaches a decision which is set forth in an Appeals Memorandum,
which is sent to the Regional Director who simply follows its instructions. 421 U.S.
at 140-41.
When certain issues designated by the General Counsel are raised by a complain-
ant's charge, the Regional Board must first submit the charge to the General Counsel's
advice branch. A committee of high-ranking members of the General Counsel's office
studies the matter and makes a recommendation. The General Counsel decides the issue
and communicates his decision to the Regional Director in an Advice Memorandum. The
memorandum contains the General Counsel's answer to the legal or policy issue, together
with a detailed legal rationale and instructions for the final processing of the case.
Based on this, the Regional Director renders his decision and, if it is adverse to the
complainant, informs him of his right to appeal. Id. at 141-42. This right to appeal is
illusory since, as a practical matter, the General Counsel has already considered the
question. Id. at 157-58. The practical effect of this administrative scheme is that a
party believing himself the victim of an, unfair labor practice "can obtain neither
adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without first persuading the Office of
General Counsel that his claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant Board considera-
tion." Id. at 139.
50. 421 U.S. at 138.
51. Id. at 148, 153-54.
52. Id. at 154 n.21. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. This approach
avoids the technical operation of the language in the FOIA which makes the Act
inapplicable to any documents falling within any of the exemptions.
53. See id. at 153. The purpose of exemption 5 is to permit the agency to withhold
documents which reflect the agency's group thinking in the process of formulating policy.
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cmi. L. Rnv. 761, 797
(1967).
[Vol. 1976:366
FOIA DEVELOPMENTS
the Court reasoned, their disclosure "poses a negligible risk of denying
to agency decisionmakers the uninhibited advice which is so important
to agency decisions. 54 Furthermore, the Court found that the FOIA
embodies a strong "congressional purpose to require disclosure of docu-
ments which have 'the force and effect of law.' "5
The second question addressed by the Court was whether the
express incorporation by reference of an otherwise exempt document
into a "final opinion" deprives the document of its exempt status. In
Sears, the NLRB had expressly incorporated into such a final opinion
documents that fell within exemption 5,56 the intra-agency memoran-
dum exemption," and other documents that fell within exemption 7,5
which exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes.50
While accepting Sears' argument that the documents which quali-
fied for the intra-agency memorandum exemption lost their exempt
status upon incorporation, the Court rejected the analogous argu-
ment for the documents that fell within exemption 7. With regard
to the former, the Court held that "if an agency chooses expressly to
adopt or incorporate by reference an intra-agency memorandum pre-
viously covered by Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final
opinion, that memorandum may be withheld only on the ground that it
falls within the coverage of some exemption other than Exemption 5.''60
The Court's rationale for this decision was simply that disclosure in
these circumstances would not contravene the purposes of the exemp-
tion.61 Specifically, the Court found that the policies in favor of
applying the exemption should yield because an employee whose advice
has been adopted is not likely to be inhibited by a fear that the adopted
advice will be made public, and because public interest in knowing the
reasons for a policy actually adopted outweigh any slight inhibition
which might result from disclosure.6 2  On the other hand, the Court
54. 421 U.S. at 152 n.19.
55. Id. at 153. Given this strong policy of disclosure of an agency's "working law"
and given that much of this "law" is likely to be contained in documents which are in
form intra-agency memoranda, "[i]t would be unreasonable to ascribe" to Congress an
intention to protect such documents in exemption 5. Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemp-
tion 1059.
56. 421 U.S. at 161.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
58. 421 U.S. at 165-66.
59. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. 1976).
60. 421 U.S. at 161 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. See note 53 supra. See generally Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption
1058-62 ("[l]ntra-agency communications in general ... will not be significantly
inhibited by a requirement that adopted policies and rationales be disclosed.").
62. 421 U.S. at 161; see Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1061.
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found that the documents which fell within the exemption for investiga-
tory records did not lose their exempt status, apparently because it
believed that requiring disclosure in this case would thwart the purposes
underlying that exemption.63
Though it reached the opposite result, the Court's approach to the
issue under the exemption for investigatory records was clearly consist-
ent with the approach taken under the intra-agency memorandum ex-
emption. The fact that an otherwise exempt document is expressly
incorporated by reference in a "final opinion" does not in itself mandate
disclosure. It merely indicates that a court must make a further inquiry
into whether the policies embodied in the particular exemption would be
contravened by giving precedence to the mandate to disclose "final
opinions."
The Court's analysis in delineating the relationship between the
exemptions and the mandate to disclose "final opinions" is bound to
have important ramifications in subsequent constructions of the Act,
since this same analysis should be applicable in determining the relation-
ship between any of the affirmative disclosure provisions and any of the
exemptions. 4 What the Court has done is to construe the exemptions
63. 421 U.S. at 166. The purposes underlying the investigatory records exemption
are not difficult to discern since they are enumerated in the exemption itself. ."Mhe
exemption applies when the production of records will interfere with enforcement
proceedings, deprive a person of a fair trial, constitute an invasion of privacy, reveal a
confidential source, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger the safety of law
enforcement personnel." Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Free-
dom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 762 (1975), citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7)
(Supp. 1976). To the extent that the disclosure of a particular investigative record
would, for example, deprive a person of a fair trial, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (B) (Supp.
1976), that consequence would surely follow even though the particular documents were
disclosed only when expressly incorporated in a "final opinion." On the other hand, it is
at least arguable that an agency's decisionmaking process is not inhibited when a
document otherwise privileged under the intra-agency memorandum exemption is dis-
closed when incorporated in a "final opinion" since the agency and not any individual
must then defend the material. See Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1060-61.
64. It is by no means clear, however, that the Court would be willing to resolve any
conflict between the exemptions and the "final opinion" provision or other affirmative
disclosure provisions in favor of disclosure. For example, the Court also addressed the
relationship between section (a) (2) (C) of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970),
making available "instructions to staff that affect a member of the public," and the intra-
agency memorandum exemption. Although it indicated that it would be "reluctant to
construe exemption five to apply" to documents so classified, 421 U.S. at 153-54, it in
fact applied the exemption to exclude from disclosure documents arguably containing
such "instructions to staff." Id. at 160. To distinguish "final opinions" from "instruc-
tions to staff," making only the former an absolute limitation on exemption 5, does not
comport with the rationale for implying the limitations in the first instance. If the
policy underlying the limitation is that "an agency should not be permitted to maintain a
body of 'secret law' which it applies in cases before it," Intra-Agency Memoranda
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where ambiguity exists in the context of the statute as a whole. The
Court indicated that it will balance the goal of disclosure as expressed in
the applicable affirmative disclosure provision against the interests pro-
tected by the arguably applicable exemption. Where a strong congres-
sional intent appears that certain materials be disclosed, it may be that
Congress did not intend that a particular exemption thwart such disclo-
sure, especially where the release of the documents in question would
not substantially impair the interest sought to be protected by the
particular exemption involved.65
WHAT IS A "FINAL OPINION"?
Because of the fact that "final opinions" and "intra-agency memo-
Exemption 1058, then it is difficult to see why disclosing instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public is any less important in implementing that policy than disclosing.
final opinions. Both, after all, aim at forcing disclosure of the "working law" of an
agency. And certainly there is no textual basis in the statute itself for such a distinction.
Both mandatory disclosure provisions are in the same subsection of the Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (2) (1970); there are no indications that the "final opinions" provision, 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (2) (A) (Supp. 1976), embodies a more important congressional
objective than does the "instructions to staff" provision, id. § 552(a)(2)(C). Indeed,
the implication is to the contrary. Both are equally important means to achieve a clear
congressional objective. Nevertheless the Supreme Court obviously felt that the mandate
to disclose "final opinions" has some special status within the statutory scheme of the
FOIA which the mandate to disclose "instructions to staff that affect a member of the
public" lacks.
65. Related to the issue of incorporation of an otherwise exempt document is the
situation in which a memorandum expressing a final opinion neither explicitly states its
rationale nor expressly incorporates another memorandum by reference. Instead it may
refer only vaguely to the "circumstances of the case" as part of its rationale. Several of
the memoranda ordered disclosed by the Court in Sears contained just such references.
The lower court had ordered the General Counsel to create explanatory material
wherever the memoranda referred to the "circumstances of the case." 421 U.S. at 161.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the courts have no power under the FOIA to
order an agency to create explanatory material or even to identify those pre-existing
documents which contain the "circumstances of the case' to which the opinion refers and
which are not identified by the party seeking disclosure. Id. at 161-62. Analytically, of
course, this is a much different problem from the situation in which an agency document
already exists. Where there is no document, by definition neither the exemptions nor
the requirement to disclose "final opinions" can apply. And the Act may not be used as
a sword to force an agency to put in writing that which it is not required by law to write.
Id.
As the Court recognizes, an analysis which refuses to compel disclosure of all
documents expressly incorporated by reference in a "final opinion" and which permits
"final opinions" to be vaguely worded and to refer to extrinsic circumstances which may
or may not be evidenced in some government file by a document implies "that some
'final opinions' will not be as easily understood as they would otherwise be. However
. . . the Act does not give the public a right to intelligible opinions in all cases." id. at
166. The problem with this approach, nevertheless, is that an agency could thwart a
basic purpose of the Act simply by drafting its "final opinions" in a particular manner.
Indeed, this approach seems to reward agencies for writing unintelligible final opinions
rife with mystical references to "the circumstances of the case."
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randums" are mutually exclusive concepts under the FOIA,66 the precise
meaning of "final opinions ... made in the adjudication of cases ' 67
becomes critical both in terms of the mandate to disclose such opinions
and in the interpretation of the exemption for intra-agency memoranda.
The Supreme Court, in two 1975 cases, addressed this issue in two
distinct factual contexts. The approach taken by the Court in both
cases to delineate the meaning of "final opinion!' was clearly a function-
al one. Particular documents were included within this classification
according to "the function of the documents in issue in the context of
the administrative process which generated them." 8
The first of these two cases was NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9
in which Sears, the charged party in an NLRB proceeding, sought the
release of Advice and Appeals Memoranda generated in the case by the
General Counsel of the Board. Sears claimed disclosure was required
because the memoranda were "final opinions" within the meaning of the
Act.70 In evaluating this claim, the Court examined the administrative
origin and function of these documents. It first noted that the NLRB
commences unfair labor practice proceedings only upon the issuance of
a complaint,71 and that Congress has delegated the "final authority on
behalf of the board" to issue such complaints to the General Counsel.7 2
Further, if the General Counsel decides a complainant's charge is with-
out merit, the decision is not reviewable by either the Board itself or by
the courts.7 3 On the other hand, a favorable disposition at the General
Counsel stage is a mere prelude to the commencement of litigation
before the Board.7 4 The Court therefore concluded that "those Advice
and Appeals Memoranda which explain decisions by the General Coun-
sel not to file a complaint are 'final opinions' made in the adjudication of
a case;"' 6 accordingly, the documents had to be disclosed unless an
66. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
67. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1976).
68. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975).
69. Id. Other aspects of Sears are discussed at notes 47-65 supra, and notes 100-26
infra and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 137.
71. Id. at 138; see 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
72. 421 U.S. at 138; see 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
74. 421 U.S. at 148, 160.
75. Id. at 148 (emphasis added). The NLRB tried to distinguish Appeals Memo-
randa from Advice Memoranda, arguing that the latter were not "final opinions" because
an appeal to the General Counsel was still procedurally possible following the Regional
Director's adverse disposition of a charge pursuant to the instructions contained in the
Advice Memorandum. See note 49 supra. But the Court rejected this as a distinction
without a difference since, as a practical matter, the General Counsel would have already
passed on the issue being appealed. Id. at 157-58.
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exemption were applicable.76 Conversely, the Court held that Advice
and Appeals Memoranda which explain the decision of the General
Counsel to file a complaint do not embody a final disposition of the
case, and thus "are not 'final opinions' made in the adjudication of a
case."
7T
The Court's analysis suggests that a document must constitute a
"final disposition" or an explanation of a "final disposition" of a case in
order to qualify as a "final opinion... made in the adjudication of
cases."' 78  The term "final disposition," in turn, would appear to be
limited to administrative actions which have some legally operative
effect on the issues in a case.79 In Sears, the memoranda explaining the
General Counsers decision not to file a complaint with the NLRB in
effect decided all substantive issues in the complaint adversely to the
complainant. This was clearly "final agency action of precedential
import."8 0 In contrast, the decision to file a complaint and the memo-
randa explaining it did not settle any substantive issues in the case. At
most, such a decision indicated only "that a legal issue [was] sufficient-
ly in doubt to warrant determination by another body" 81-hardly a
"final disposition."
The Court adopted a similar approach to the problem in Renego-
tiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.8" The docu-
ments sought in this case were generated by the Renegotiation Board8 3
during the course of deciding whether certain government contractors
had earned, and therefore had to refund, "excessive profits" on their
government contracts. Under the enforcement scheme employed by the
Board, various documents were completed at different stages of the
proceeding. The first step of the proceeding was an initial determina-
tion by the Board of excessive profits, at which time the case was referred
to a Regional Board. 4 If the Regional Board found no excessive profits,
76. Of course, the intra-agency memorandum exemption does not apply to docu-
ments classified as "final opinions." Id.; see notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 148, 160.
78. Id. at 158-59, 160.
79. See id. at 159. See also Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp.,
421 U.S. 168, 1,84-85 (1975) (recommendation of an advisory board to a decisionmaker
which carries no legal weight-either de jure or de facto-before the decisionmaker
is not a "final opinion"). Grumman Aircraft is discussed at notes 82-93 infra and
accompanying text.
80. 421 U.S. at 157.
81. Id. at 160.
82. 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
83. The activities of the Renegotiation Board are governed by the Renegotiation Act
of 1951, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211 et seq. (1970).
84. The Board's authority to delegate responsibilities to Regional Boards is derived
from the Renegotiation Act. Id. § 1217(d); 32 C.F.R. § 1451.32 (1975).
Vol. 1976:366]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
it would send a recomendation to the Renegotiation Board that no action
be taken against the contractor and, if the Board approved, the case was
simply closed. Apparently, the Board sent no explanation to the con-
tractor of its reasons for agreeing with the Regional Board's recommen-
dation.85 On the other hand, in cases where the Regional Board did
find excessive profits, the case was then referred to a division of the
Renegotiation Board consisting of three of the five members of the
Board,8 6 which, after an investigation, made a decision and sent a report
to the full Board. Although this report formed a basis for the discus-
sion of the case, it did not bind any member of the Board.87 Grumman
sought both Regional Board reports which recommended that no action
be taken against the contractor and also the Division reports.
In holding that the Regional Board reports were not "final opin-
ions," the Court noted that only the full Board had the power to render
the legal decision on the existence of excessive profits,8 8 and further that
there was no indication in this case that the Board had adopted the
reports as its opinion. 9 The Regional Board's recommendation was
"functionally indistinguishable from the recommendation of any agency
staff member whose judgment has earned the respect of a decisionmak-
er."00 The key was that the Regional Board simply lacked any "deci-
sional authority" whatsoever, and without such authority its reports did
not rise to the level of "final opinions." '
The Court also held that the Division reports were not "final
opinions."0 2 As it did in the analysis concerning the status of Regional
Board reports, the Court focused on whether the Division had any
power to decide the issue of excessive profits or whether the function it
exercised was merely that of analysis and recommendation. The Court
found the Division to be powerless in terms of actually deciding any
question and further found that the analysis of the Division report itself
85. At least no reasons were sent in the Grumman case. 421 U.S. at 178-79.
86. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1217(e) (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 1472.4(b) (1975).
87. Cf. 32 C.F.R. § 1472.4(b) (1975).
88. 421 U.S. at 184. The Court pointed out, however, that this case is distinguisha-
ble from one where a Regional Board has de facto decisional authority. In other words,
if the Board received the Regional Board's recommendation under a deferential standard,
or even if the Board failed to review the vast bulk of the reports absent some special
circumstances, then the Regional Board reports might be held to constitute "final opin-
ions." Id. at 185 n.22.
89. Id. at 185-86.
90. Id. at 187.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. at 184-85, 190.
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was never adopted by the full Board as its reasoning, though the
Division's conclusion might have been.93
Combining the Sears and Grumman Aircraft analyses makes it
clear that there are two separate issues which must be dealt with in
deciding whether a particular agency document is a "final opinion...
made in the adjudication of cases." First, the power of the governmen-
tal unit which renders the final opinion must be examined. If the
particular decision carries no weight in a legal sense (as opposed to a
recommendation), then it is not a "final opinion." For example, in
Grumman the Regional Board reports which recommended that no
action be taken against the contractor had no operative effect independ-
ent of review by the Renegotiation Board. Indeed, review by the full
Board was automatic.94 In Sears, on the other hand, the decision of the
General Counsel of the NLRB not to issue a complaint clearly had a
legally operative effect, since it effectively barred the complainant from
access to the Labor Board.
After it has determined that the governmental unit rendering the
opinion has the requisite power, a court must ask whether the opinion
was issued in conjunction with an "adjudication" of a case. This second
issue explains the distinction made by the Supreme Court in Sears
between the General Counsel's decision not to file a complaint with the
NLRB and his decision to file such a complaint.9 5 Certainly the
decision to file a complaint has a legally operative effect9 6 just as did a
decision not to file a complaint. The distinction is that the decision to
file a complaint requires the General Counsel to adjudicate none of the
issues in the case. In deciding not to file a complaint, on the other
hand, the General Counsel effectively adjudicates all of the issues
against the complainant.97
93. Id. at 188-90.
94. Id. at 187 ("Mhe recommendation of the Regional Board carries no legal
weight whatever before the Board." (emphasis in original)).
95. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
96. "Although not a 'final opinion' in the 'adjudication' of a 'ease' because it does
not effect a 'final disposition,' the memorandum [directing the filing of a complaint]
does explain a decision already reached by the General Counsel which has real operative
effect-it permits litigation before the Board ... ." Id. at 160.
97. One lower court case in 1975 dealt with the final opinion issue. National Prison
Project v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1975). The plaintiff there claimed that the
failure of the United States Board of Parole to make available for public inspection and
copying the records which contained the final opinions of the agency denying inmates'
applications for parole violated the mandate to reveal "final opinions ... made in the
adjudication of cases." Id. at 791. The real question in the case was whether "the
process by which the Board determines whether or not parole should be granted" is an
adjudication. Id. Though the case was decided before Sears, the court in Sigler took A
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INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION
Exemption 5 of the FOLA excludes from the disclosure provisions
of the Act "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency."'98 An external limitation on the scope of
this exemption has already been discussed,19 but it should be noted that
the exemption also contains its own internal standards which limit its
scope. First, it applies only to material which would not be discovera-
ble by a party in litigation, with the agency. Second, the exemption
covers only those documents which qualify as "memorandums or let-
ters." Both of these limitations were the subject of detailed analysis by
the courts in 1975.
The Discovery Limitation
In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,100 the Supreme Court attempt-
ed to give this vague discovery limitation 0 1 some meaning consistent
with the goals and purposes of the Act. The language of the exemption
previously had been interpreted by several lower courts,10 2 and to a
limited extent by the Supreme Court itself.10 3 The lower courts had
generally defined the limitation in terms of a distinction between those
memoranda which contained factual material and those which contained
only advice or opinions. 0 4 This distinction, the courts reasoned, was
necessary in order to implement the legislative policy of the exemption
to protect the "frank discussion of legal or policy matter in writing ' 10 5
within the government. 0 6
practical approach toward the issue of what is an "adjudication." The court concluded
that the parole hearing process is an adjudication, because the "decision is rendered upon
consideration of opposing factual claims in the context of defined standards." Id. at 792.
In light of Sears, a better analysis would be that the opinions of the parole board have a
legally operative effect by foreclosing, issues of fact and law. Thus they are clearly
within the definition of "final opinions" set forth in Sears regardless of whether the
process of rendering an opinion resembles a trial-like adjudication.
98. 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
99. See notes 43-55 supra and accompanying text.
100. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). Other aspects of Sears are discussed at notes 47-65, 69-81
supra and accompanying text.
101. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973) ("In many important respects, the
rules governing discovery in such litigation [with a government agency] have remained
uncertain from the very beginnings of the Republic.").
102. See id. at 89 n.16 (and cases cited therein).
103. Id. at 85-9t.
104. Id. at 89 & n.16 (citing cases).
105. S. RP,. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
106. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1973); Intra-Agency Memoranda Ex-
emption 1049-50,
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The approach taken by the Court in Sears may be viewed as a
departure from the analysis used in these earlier cases. The Court
began with the words of the exemption itself---"[exemption 5 with-
holds from a member of the public documents which a private party
could not discover in litigation with the agency."101  Of course, as the
Court in Sears noted, "virtually any document not privileged may be
discovered by the appropriate litigant, if it is relevant to his litigation
.... !,108 Yet the whole thrust of the FOLA is to divorce the public's
right to government information from a showing of a particularized
need for it.'09 In a manner consistent with this goal, the Court inter-
preted the provision "to exempt those documents, and only those docu-
ments normally privileged in the civil discovery context.""n0 In other
words, so long as the material in question would "routinely be disclosed
in private litigation,""' a party has a right to disclosure under the FOIA
107. 421 U.S. at 148, citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973). Of course,
exemption 5 does not exempt "documents"; it literally exempts "memorandums or
letters." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970). There was no question in Sears as to whether
the documents in issue were such "memorandums or letters." Thus one should not
conclude that this limit on the scope of the exemption has become a nullity through the
Court's use of unnecessarily broad language. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 37 AD.
L.2D 685, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pointing out that Sears did not address the "memoran-
dums or letters" issue). See notes 153-57 infra and accompanying text.
108. 421 U.S. at 149 & n.16.
109. The Act provides that upon proper request an agency "shall make the records
promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis
added). See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973); cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 149 n.16 (1975):
Sears' rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of
the fact that it claims an interest in the Advice and Appeals Memoranda
greater than that shared by the average member of the public. The Act is fun-
damentally designed to inform the public about agency action and not to bene-
fit private litigants. Id. at 143 n.10.
110. 421 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 149 n.16, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966); see
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("disclosure under the
Act is not to depend upon the needs of a particular litigant"). The Court apparently did
not consider the argument that, although the Act precludes an inquiry into the needs of a
particular claimant in deciding whether a document would be discoverable in litigation
with an agency, it might permit an inquiry into the general public's need for the
document. On this analysis a sufficiently strong public interest might warrant the
disclosure of a document which would not "routinely be disclosed in private litigation."
Such a general public interest standard is implicit in the Act. Indeed, in the section of
the statute authorizing agencies to charge reasonable fees for providing requested
information, the agencies are explicitly told that they may waive or reduce fees where it
"is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as
primarily benefiting the general public." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4) (A) (Supp. 1976).
Moreover, any damage done to the decisionmaking process by releasing such information
would be more than outweighed by the countervailing benefit to the public which,
assuming a showing of strong public need, would result from disclosure.
Neverthless, the refusal to extend the explicit civil discovery analogy of the intra-
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regardless of his ability to demonstrate the type of special interest which
might be required to obtain the documents in the civil discovery context.
Thus, the Court shifted the focus of analysis under the exemption from
whether the requested letters or memoranda contain facts or opinions to
whether the government can find any common law or statutory privilege
which would arguably prevent disclosure in the normal case.
The Court went on to examine the applicability of specific privi-
leges to the documents sought by Sears. The government claimed that
the documents--Advice and Appeals Memoranda of the General Coun-
sel of the NLRB which recommended that the Board commence an
unfair labor practice proceeding against Sears--were covered by an
attorney work product privilege and by executive privilege.
11 2
With little difficulty, the Court concluded that these memoranda
fell within the attorney work product privilege. In its view, the privi-
lege, as incorporated by Congress into the exemption, applies to memo-
randa prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation which sets
forth his theory of the case.'1 3 Since the General Counsel "must
become a litigating party to the case with respect to which he has made
his decision,"'1 4 the Advice and Appeals Memoranda which directed the
filing of the complaint fell squarely within the privilege.
While concluding that executive privilege did not apply to these
documents, the Court had more difficulty in defining the "precise
contours" of that privilege.'1 5 The main purpose of the privilege in the
agency memorandum exemption to allow a showing of compelling need to overcome the
exemption is a further development of the Court's construction of the exemption begun
in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). In Mink, the Court stated that the "discovery
rules [could] only be applied under Exemption 5 by way of rough analogies" since these
rules themselves varied with the posture of the litigants before a court. Id. at 86.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that the FOLA, by its terms, did not "permit inquiry
into particularized needs of the individual seeking the information, although such an
inquiry would ordinarily be made of a private litigant." Id. Refusing to extend the civil
discovery analogy to allow a showing of need is consistent with the "rough analogy"
notion of Mink and the general philosophy of the FOIA to divorce the right of access to
government information from the showing of a particularized need. See Note, Develop-
ments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251, 269 n.105;
Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1051 n.22.
112. Those Advice and Appeals Memoranda in which the General Counsel refused to
file a complaint were not in issue here since the Court had already found these to be
"final opinions" and thus outside the scope of the fifth exemption. See notes 51-52
supra and accompanying text.
113. 421 U.S. at 154, citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965)
(exemption 5 includes working papers of the agency attorney "and documents which
would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to private parties").
114. 421 U.S. at 160.
115. Id. at 150.
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context of the FOIA, the Court noted, is to "prevent injury to the quality
of agency decisions."" 6  This rationale enabled the Court to make use
of a distinction designed to confine the scope of the privilege to protec-
tion of the "ingredients of the decisionmaking process":117 in deciding
whether this privilege is available, a court should distinguish "between
predecisional communications, which are privileged, and communica-
tions made after the decision and designed to explain it
[postdecisional], which are not." ' 8
Read broadly, this distinction, which the Court itself recognized
"may not always be a bright one,"1 19 might include within the privilege
all matters considered by an agency in the formulation of its policies and
exclude only those communications which explain an agency decision
already adopted. Arguably, under this formulation such things as
predecisional statistical studies and factual surveys would be privileged.
The practical effect of the distinction drawn by the Court, however,
is not at all-clear. It is evident that the Court's purpose in making the
distinction was to substitute for the fact-opinion dichotomy a standard
which recognizes that withholding purely factual matter may be
appropriate in some circumstances because of its function in the decision-
making process. The new problem raised is determining the circum-
stnces in which such factual material should be privileged, even though
it is generated in a "predecisional" context.' 20  Certainly such material
may be as crucial to the decisionmaking process as advice and opin-
ions.1 21 Yet the real question in terms of the Act is not necessarily
whether the factual material is crucial to a decision, but whether its dis-
closure will so inhibit the decisionmaking processes of an agency as to
justify an exception to the general policy of disclosure which the Act
embodies.122
This does not, however, appear to be the approach taken by the
Court. Instead of establishing a procedure in which each predecisional
document containing factual matter is examined in order to decide
116. Id. at 151.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted). The Court made two arguments in support of
this distinction. First, the possibility of injuring the decisionmaking process by publica-
tion of postdecisional communications is considerably less than the potential harm from
publication of predecisional communications. Second, and more importantly, there is an
increased public interest in knowing the basis for an agency policy already adopted. Id.
119. Id. at 152 n.19.
120. It is difficult to imagine many factual documents being generated by an agency
other than in a predecisional context.
121. See Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1055.
122. See id. at 1055-56.
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whether the particular document should be withheld, the Court has
created a broad presumption that any letters or memoranda which can
be classified as predecisional are privileged. Arguably, this classifica-
tion of a document as either predecisional or postdecisional requires an
analysis of its contents, so that a factual document, although actually
generated before the decision and used in the decisionmaking process,
could be classified as a postdecisional document if disclosure would not
injure the "quality of agency decisions." 123 But a literal reading of the
Court's statement of the distinction suggests that the inquiry is a narrow-
er one, aimed merely at identifying the point within the agency process
at which the document came into existence.124  This presumption that
all matter, whether fact or opinion, generated by an agency before it.
reaches a decision is privileged entails an unwarranted expansion of the
scope of exemption 5.125 It does not improve on the fact-opinion
dichotomy. Indeed, it is far more mechanical in its application. Fur-
thermore, as one commentator has suggested, "the general disclosure
policy that underlies the entire F[O]IA will tolerate exemption for
nonfactual material. . . far better than it will tolerate exemption for
clearly factual material.' 28  There is little justification beyond expe-
diency for expanding the executive privilege component of the intra-
agency memorandum exemption to factual predecisional matter absent
a specific showing in each case of injury to the decisionmaking process.
Several lower courts have addressed the executive privilege facet of
exemption 5 subsequent to Sears. In Brockway v. Department of the
Air Force, 27 an FOIA plaintiff sought to compel the disclosure of
certain statements by witnesses gathered by the Air Force in the course
of an investigation into a plane crash. Because of the Air Force's need to
get all relevant information in order to prevent further accidents, the
witnesses were assured that the information given would be kept confi-
123. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
124. Such an argument was advanced by the government and rejected by the court in
Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This case is discussed
at notes 139-45 infra and accompanying text.
125. In Sears, the Court indicated that a proper construction of exemption 5 is one
that results in "'the withholding of all paper which reflect the agency's group thinking
in the process of working out its policy and determining what its law shall be.'" 421
U.S. at 153, quoting Davis, supra note 53, at 797. Arguably this is itself a narrower
formulation of the privilege than the "predecisional" formulation apparently adopted by
the Court: in determining whether a document reflects an agency's group thinking in
formulating policy, not only is it relevant to determine whether the document is
predecisional but also it is necessary to inquire whether its contents actually "reflect" the
agency's thinking.
126. Intra-Agency Memoranda Exemption 1056.
127. 518 F. 2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975).
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dential and would not be used for any purpose other than for accident
prevention.128 In light of the fact that the material sought did not
consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflect-
ing deliberative processes, but rather consisted of purely factual or
investigatory reports, the Eighth Circuit had to face squarely the conten-
tion that the intra-agency memorandum exemption "protects from dis-
closure only memoranda which are deliberative in nature, and that no
other standard is permissible in any instance for determining if a docu-
ment comes within the scope of" the exemption.'" 9
Relying in part on Sears, the court rejected the argument that
exemption 5 applies only to policy memoranda and not to factual
matter."' Instead, it approached the claim of privilege from the per-
spective of the "purposes and goals of the. FOTA and this specific
exemption."'' The court found that the purpose of the exemption, as
expressed by the Supreme Court in Sears, is "to prevent injury to the
quality of agency decisions.' 3 2  The court noted that the wording of
exemption 5 itself does not make a factual-deliberative distinction, but
rather speaks in terms of whether material sought under the FOIA
would be discoverable in general proceedings.' 33 In this instance there
was authority, in a non-FOIA setting, which recognized a qualified
executive privilege in pretrial discovery for witness statements given in a
military aircraft safety investigation, even though such statements were
not deliberative documents. 3 4 Thus the statements in question came
128. Id. After every crash the Air Force conducts two separate investigations. One,
called the "collateral investigation," is designed "to obtain and preserve all available
evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, and for all other purposes
except for safety and accident prevention purposes." Id. The results of this investiga-
tion were not in question here. The second investigation, the "aircraft accident
investigation" or "safety investigation," is designed "for the sole purpose of accident
prevention." Id. No law enforcement or other purposes are contemplated. The theory
behind the two separate investigations is that a witness might be hesitant to testify freely
before the collateral investigation board for fear of revealing his own negligence or
misconduct. Id. at 1185-86. The promise of confidentiality removes this inhibition for
the safety investigation.
129. Id. at 1190.
130. Id. at 1192.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1193, quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
133. 518 F.2d at 1192; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
134. 518 F.2d at 1191, citing Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963). The grounds for extending the privilege to cover these state-
ments were that disclosure would "hamper the efficient operation of an important Gov-
ernment program and perhaps even . . . impair the national security by weakening a
branch of the military. . . ." 316 F.2d at 339. In Machin, the plaintiff sought to sub-
poena an Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigative Report of a plane crash in which the
plaintiff was the sole survivor. The information had been solicited from witnesses with
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within the literal words of the exemption: they "would not be available
by law to a party . . . in litigation with the agency."' 35  The court,
however, did not rest its decision on this ground alone. Rather, it
proceeded independently to balance the general policy of disclosure
under the Act against the purpose of the exemption to ensure a free flow
of information and discussion within an agency.' 36 In its judgment,
releasing the information sought would have injured the "deliberative
processes of the Air Force in establishing appropriate safety policies,"' 7
and hence the intra-agency memorandum exemption was clearly appli-
cable.
The facts of Brockway directly raise the issue of whether predeci-
sional factual matter falls within the executive privilege component of
the intra-agency memorandum exemption. Sears seems to extend the
exemption to all predecisional documents whether factual or delibera-
tive. Yet the Brockway court did not adopt this analysis; indeed, the
court did not mention the predecisional-postdecisional issue. Rather,
the court interpreted Sears to compel an analysis of a claim of privilege
for factual material in terms of the underlying purpose of the exemption.
If the disclosure of the factual matter would hinder the gathering of the
facts themselves, as it surely would have in the Brockway case, then
nondisclosure is justified. 38
The District of Columbia Circuit has applied the
predecisional-postdecisional analysis in Vaughn v. Rosen. 39 In that
case the government invoked exemption 5 in an effort to resist disclo-
sure of certain personnel reports compiled by the Civil Service Commis-
sion's Bureau of Personnel Management.140  The government claimed
that the reports were within the predecisional deliberative process be-
cause they played a consultive role in the process "by which the agency
evaluates and changes its personnel policies, rules, regulations, and
standards .... ,,141 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that
the promise that the Air Force would use the testimony solely for the purposes of flight
safety, and that it would not be revealed to persons outside the Air Force. Id.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
136. 518 F.2d at 1193.
137. Id. at 1194.
138. See id. The court did not reject "the general fact-deliberation criterion estab-
lished in the decisions of other courts." Rather, it held that on the narrow facts involved
"common sense as reflected in the general law of discovery ...indicates disclosure of
these statements would defeat rather than further the purposes of the FOIA and is not
required by the language of the FOLA itself." Id.
139. 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 1139, 1143. The government also raised an issue in the case involving
exemption 2, the internal personnel rules exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
141. 523 F.2d at 1143.
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the documents provided only "raw data upon which decisions can be
made; they are not themselves a part of the decisional process." '142 The
fact that a document is used by a decisionmaker to determine policy
does not in itself make that document "predecisional":
Unevaluated factual reports or summaries of past administrative
determinations are frequently used by decisionmakers in coming to a
determination, and yet it is beyond dispute that such documents would
not be exempt from disclosure. Rather, to come within the privilege
and thus within exemption 5, the document must be a direct part of
the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses
opinions on legal or policy matters. Put another way, pre-decisional
materials are not exempt merely because they are pre-decisional; they
must also be a part of the agency give-and-take--of the deliberative
process-by which the decision itself is made.143
Unlike the Brockway court, which failed even to mention the
predecisional-postdecisional test enunciated in Sears when evaluating the
claim that the executive privilege component of the fifth exemption
applied to the material in question, the Rosen court used a reasoned
application of the predecisional-postdecisional analysis. 44 Conse-
quently, its approach to the problem at least offers some guidance to the
proper interpretation of the Sears test. The Rosen court's analysis
suggests that the predecisional-postdecisional distinction must not be
used in the mechanical sense that a literal reading of Sears implies.
Rather, the court attempted to apply the distinction with reference to the
ultimate goal of the exemption to "prevent injury to the quality of
agency decisions.' 45  Thus, while the documents in question in Rosen
were generated prior to the agency decision to which they related and,
further, were actually used in the decisionmaking process, the court held
that they did not fall within the exemption because the requisite harm to
establish executive privilege had not been demonstrated.
Memorandums or Letters
The other limitation on the scope of the intra-agency memorandum
exemption, which also was subject to analysis in 1975, is that the
142. Id. at 1146.
143. Id. at 1144.
144. It is possible that the type of analysis employed by the court in Rosen would
have produced a different result in Brockway, since it is not clear that the requested
materials in the latter case-witness reports gathered during the course of the safety
investigation-were a "direct part of the deliberative process in that [they made]
recommendations or expresse[d] opinions on legal or policy matters." Id. See notes
127-38 supra and accompanying text.
145. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., -421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
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exemption applies only to "memorandums or letters. 146  In cases de-
cided prior to 1975 the lower courts did not often directly face this issue.
In applying the fact-opinion distinction which was used at that time to
determine whether the documents in question fell within the exemption,
the courts did not explicitly break down their analysis into two parts;
that is, whether the document was a letter or memorandum, and if so,
whether the document was privileged pursuant to the exemption. In-
stead, they simply approached the issue by determining whether a
particular document contained factual matter or opinion. If it con-
tained factual matter, the government could not invoke the exemption to
prevent disclosure; if it contained opinion, it was treated as exempt
without inquiry into whether it was a "memorandum or letter."' 47
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). This issue is a crucial one because of the
extensive breadth of the executive privilege applicable to those documents which fall
within the scope of the exemption. Since it is possible for purely factual material to
come within the executive privilege component of exemption 5, e.g., Brockway v. De-
partment of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 127-38 supra); Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 71 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (summaries of factual material prepared from public record of a formal pro-
ceeding by staff for administrator); Cooper v. Department of the Navy, 396 F. Supp.
1040, 1042 (D.C. La. 1975) (witness statements gathered in a safety investigation under
promise of confidentiality), the best argument left for compelling its disclosure may be
that the exemption itself has no application, thus preventing the invocation of any of its
component privileges.
147. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970) ("purely factual" reports are not protected by exemption 5);
Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("purely factual" matter must be disclosed).
One reason the courts did not address the "memorandums" requirement before
Sears may be suggested. In a case in which a court determined that the material
requested was "factual," there was no need to determine whether the exemption did not
apply because the documents were not "memorandums" or because the documents would
have been available to a party in litigation with the agency. It was assumed that the
latter requirement was meant to exclude all factual matter from the scope of the
exemption. On the other hand, once a court decided that the material in issue reflected
opinions and would therefore not be available to a party in litigation with the agency, the
"memorandum" requirement would not realistically be an issue since the "opinions"
contained in the documents sought would necessarily contain an agency's thinking on
issues-which, of course, would satisfy the most stringent definition of "memorandums."
Indeed, the "letters or memorandums" issue will arise only in the context of an
interpretation of exemption 5 which includes, within the scope of its "available by law to
a party . . . in litigation with the agency" limitation, factual matter. Since Sears
appears to sanction this interpretation in its predecisional-postdecisional distinction and
since Sears has been read by some lower courts to permit the withholding of purely
factual matter when it would not normally be available to a party in litigation with the
agency, Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975);
Cooper v. Department of the Navy, 396 F. Supp. 1040 (D.C. La. 1975), the issue has
now in fact arisen. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 37 AD. L2d 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Two courts, however, did refuse to sanction the government's
invocation of exemption 5 on the precise ground that the documents in
issue were not "letters or memorandums." In Stokes v. Brennan,148 the
government argued that certain manuals and films used in training
OSHA inspectors were privileged under the intra-agency memorandum
exemption. The court rejected this argument because, the training
manuals were "impersonal, mass-produced statement[s] of established
policy designed to be utilized as an educational and reference toor' and
hence could not be characterized as memorandums."1 9 Similarly, in
M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 5 ' the court refused to accept the
government's contention that an SEC staff investigation of certain as-
pects of the stock market was privileged pursuant to exemption 5. The
court concluded that "the documents involved are not inter-agency or
intra-agency memoranda or letters. Thus, they are not encompassed by
[exemption 5]. ''151 This conclusion rested on the court's evaluation of
the documents which it determined did not "express an exchange of
ideas between agencies or their respective staff-members.' 5 2  Thus,
while the courts prior to 1975 had not delineated anything like a precise
definition of "letters or memorandums," they had clearly indicated that
it was a substantial requirement which limits the scope of the intra-
agency memoranda exemption.
One 1975 FOIA case directly addressed this issue. In Title Guar-
antee Co. v. NLRB, 5 5 the company, a charged party in an unfair labor
practice proceeding, requested the NLRB to disclose written reports or
signed affidavits which the Board had obtained through interviews of
witnesses offered by the charging party. In an effort to prevent disclo-
sure, the Board invoked the intra-agency memorandum, exemption,
148. 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
149. Id. at 704. If the material it had before it were "memorandums," the court
noted the term "would cover virtually all government documents of any description or
nature." Id.
150. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
151. Id. at 470.
152. Id. There was no "administrative policy-making process exhibited in any of the
...documents presented." A frequently cited passage which illustrates the manner in
which the court approached the "memorandums" requirement came from the court in
Bristol-Myers:
[Exemption 5] encourages the free exchange of ideas among government pol-
icy makers, but it does not authorize an agency to throw a protective blanket
over all information by casting it in the form of an internal memorandum.
Purely factual reports and scientific studies cannot be cloaked in secrecy by
an exemption designed to protect only "those internal working papers in which
opinions are expressed and policies formulated and recommended." 424 F.2d
935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (emphasis added).
153. 37 AD. L.2D 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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claiming that under NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,5 4 "the scope of
this exemption is parallel to that of the privilege doctrine in the civil
discovery context. '' 55 The court rejected the argument that Sears was
dispositive of the issue, reasoning that the documents involved in that
case "clearly fell within the category envisioned by Congress through its
use of the phrase 'inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters.' ,56 The witness statements involved in Title Guarantee, on the
other hand, were not the sort of documents that Congress intended to
include within the meaning of "memorandums or letters." In the
court's view, such statements were "purely factual, investigative matters"
to which exemption 5 did not apply. They were to be distinguished
from "material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes" which
came within the scope of the exemption. 57
In reaching its decision, the Title Guarantee court had to consider
an earlier 1975 case, Brockway v. Department of the Air Force,5" in
which the court had reached the opposite result on similar facts. In
Brockway, the court held that certain witness statements given during a
safety investigation under a promise of confidentiality were covered by
exemption 5 because the information would literally not have been
"available by law to a party ...in litigation with the agency" and
because the release of the statements would in any case have injured the
Air Force's ability to investigate accidents with a view toward preven-
tion.1 59 The court's analysis of the problem is inadequate, however,
since it assumed without discussion that the witness statements demand-
ed were comprehended within the "memorandums or letters" limitation
of the intra-agency memorandum exemption. 60
154. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
155. 37 AD. L.2D at 688. The Board maintained that under both executive privilege
and the attorney work-product privilege the witness statements were protected.
156. Id. at 689.
157. Id. "In the case at bar.. the material requested consists solely of statements
made in support of the union's charges.... This material does not fall within the
scope of the 'memorandums or letters' exemption of exemption 5." Id.
158. 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975). Other aspects of Brockway are discussed at
notes 127-38 supra and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 1192-93.
160. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970). It is possible, of course, that the court would
have reached the conclusion that the information was of a type included in the
"memorandums" requirement of the exemption. See note 161 infra and accompanying
text. That the court in Brockway did not consider the issue to be critical may be traced
to some broad language used by the Supreme Court in Sears to describe the scope of
exemption 5. "Exemption 5 withholds from a member of the public documents which a
private party could not discover in litigation with the agency." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. at 148, citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973) (emphasis
added). Read literally such a statement would remove whatever limitation on the exemp-
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Yet without reference to this defect in the Brockway court's analy-
sis, and in spite of the fact that the type of documents involved in both
cases were so similar-in Title Guarantee they were witness statements
gathered for law enforcement purposes and in Brockway they were
witness statements gathered for the purpose of future accident preven-
tion-the Title Guarantee court managed to distinguish Brockway. The
court noted that unlike the witness statements in the case before it, those
in Brockway, though purely "factual in nature, were of use in the
Department's future planning."1 1  Consequently they were part of the
"policy-making process" and ipso facto "memorandums" within the
meaning of exemption 5.
In any event, the approach of the court in Title Guarantee is
preferable to that of the court in Brockway because it takes into account
all of the language of exemption 5. It has the virtue of placing a
substantial limitation on the scope of an exemption which has been the
focus of much pressure for expansion. Indeed, without the limitation
suggested in Title Guarantee, the exemption has the potential to swallow
many of the other specific exemptions.'62
The meaning the court attributed to "memorandums" is not, how-
ever, particularly clear or necessarily correct. Evidently the term in-
eludes all "material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes."
Because the court agreed with the result in Brockway, it may also be
inferred that certain sensitive factual material gathered by an agency and
tion that may be conveyed by the "memorandums or letters" requirement. There is, how-
ever, no reason to believe the Court intended that result or that the use of the word "doc-
uments" was anything more than an unfortunate use of broad language. Indeed in none
of the Court's decisions involving exemption 5 has there been any issue as to whether
particular documents were "memorandums or letters." Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB,
37 AD. L.2D 685, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying
text and note 107 supra.
161. 37 AD. L2D at 690.
162. A good example of how exemption 5 may be used to swallow the other
exemptions is provided by Title Guarantee itself. The witness statements at issue had
been gathered for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 691-92. Thus, the most ap-
propriate exemption would have been the seventh, which generally exempts investiga-
tory records. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. 1976). The government, however, failed
to prove that any of the enumerated reasons justifying the privilege under exemption 7
existed. 37 AD. L2D at 692. Thus, the government attempted to invoke the broad
component privileges contained in exemption 5. See also Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash,
37 A. L2D 933, 949 (D.S.C. 1975) ("[E]xemption 5 harbors a vast potential for
frustration of the purposes of the FOIA Act when employed by an agency intent on
shrouding its operations in a veil of secrecy."); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1145
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (interpretation of exemption 5 urged by government would "virtually
foreclose all public knowledge regarding implementation of personnel policies in any
given agency.").
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directly related to future planning and policy is included within the
definition. On the other hand, investigative material gathered for law
enforcement purposes, including witness statements, does not come
within the meaning of "memorandums."' 3  It is difficult to justify
distinguishing between witness statements gathered for non-law enforce-
ment purposes such as future planning and witness statements gathered
for law enforcement purposes. Neither kind of statement reflects the
deliberative or policy-making process in the sense that an agency's think-
ing on any matter is exposed by or reflected in it. Rather, both are
simply information-gathering devices. The court in Title Guarantee, by
stretching the term "memorandum" to protect information gathering by
an agency for "planning' purposes, has expanded the fifth exemption
beyond protecting the decisionmaking process to protecting the informa-
tion-gathering ability of the agencies. Yet it is arguable that several of
the other exemptions are more precisely tailored to accomplish that
purpose. For example, exemption 3 (protecting material "specifically
exempt from disclosure by statute"), exemption 4 (protecting trade
secrets and commmercial information obtained from a person), exemp-
tion 6 (protecting personnel and medical files), exemption 7 (protect-
ing investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes), and
exemption 8 (protecting information gathered from or about financial
institutions) all seem designed to protect the sources of government
information. To argue, then, that the disclosure of Brockway-type
material would inhibit the decisionmaking process and thus that
exemption 5 should apply misses the point. For the intra-agency mem-
orandum exemption does not protect from disclosure any material
the disclosure of which may inhibit the agency from making a decision.
It protects only "memorandums or letters" which, it is suggested, should
be construed to mean only those communications, both factual and
163. Arguably the court should not have distinguished Brockway, but rather included
the witness statements there in controversy within the definition of "memorandums." In
distinguishing the case the court sanctioned a very broad meaning for the term. Clearly
such factual matter does not itself reflect the deliberative or policy-making processes, and
its disclosure would in no way have revealed the internal decisionmaking processes of the
agency, Although the effect of disclosure may have been to impair the agency's ability to
plan in order to avoid other accidents by making it very difficult for the agency to gather
accident information in the future, the witness statements in Brockway were simply not
documents which reflected the agency's thinking on a particular matter. The fact that
the court in Title Guarantee Co. felt the need to stretch the definition to include them
demonstrates the practical necessity for withholding material of this sort. But a better
result would be to acknowledge that the FOIA is deficient in not recognizing an
exemption for investigative material solicited with a promise of confidentiality from
individuals for a purpose other than for law enforcement and not involving trade secrets
or commercial or financial information.
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recommendatory, which reflect the agency's decisionmaking process.164
STATUTORY EXEMPTION
Exemption 3 of the FOIA excludes from the coverage of the Act
those matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."'1 5 In
recent years the scope of this exemption has been the subject of much
disagreement among the lower courts. 6 " However, a 1975 Supreme
Court case, FAA Administrator v. Robertson,16 7 appears to have settled
the controversy, though in a manner not fully anticipated by any of the
lower courts.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson, the lower
federal courts had reached at least three different interpretations of the
scope of exemption 3. In one line of cases, the phrase "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute" was construed to apply "only if a
statute either identifies some class or category of items that Congress
considers appropriate for exemption, or at least, sets out legislatively
prescribed standards or guidelines that the Secretary must follow in
determining what matter shall be exempted from disclosure."' 68  This
narrower interpretation of the scope of the exemption rested upon a
perception of the FOIA as a response to the abuse of broad discretion
given under the old Administrative Procedure Act to officers in the
executive branch.' 6 9
Courts which adopted a second interpretation of the statutory
exemption distinguished between statutes which contained words pro-
hibiting disclosure followed by words "allowing the Secretary to relax the
164. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoted in part
at text accompanying note 143 supra).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
166. See FOIA Developments 432-33.
167. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
168. Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 640 (3d Cir. 1974); FOJA Developments
432. The court in Stretch held that a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1306(a) (1970), giving the agency authority to withhold any information except insofar
as agency regulations permitted disclosure, was not the kind of statute contemplated by
exemption 3 because it failed to prescribe some basis for the exercise of the Secretary's
discretion. 495 F.2d at 640. Accord, Schecter v. Weinberger, 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir.
1974). Similarly, in Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), the court held that a
statute giving an agency the power to withhold information when disclosure would not
be in the public interest did not come within the scope of exemption 3. 498 F.2d at
1031-32, construing 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). This holding was based on the fact
that, as in Stretch, the statute did not "itself specify the documents or categories of
documents it authorizes to be withheld from public scrutiny." 498 F.2d at 1032; accord,
Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974).
169. Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 641 (3d Cir. 1974).
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absolute prohibition established by Congress,' 170 and those which mere-
ly authorized the administrator to exercise his discretion to order nondis-
closure. The former type of statute would come within exemption 3
while the latter would not.'7 ' These courts construed the word "specifi-
cally" in the exemption to require "no more than that the exemption be
found in the words of the statute rather than the implication of it.' 172 It
is clear that this construction broadens the sweep of the exemption from
the first construction discussed above.
Judge MacKinnon of the District of Columbia Circuit had suggest-
ed yet a third interpretation of exemption 3 .17 He argued that the issue
in each case should be whether Congress intended to include the partic-
ular statute in question within the third exemption.7 4 If so, then the
statute "specifically" exempted the material within the meaning of the
statutory exemption without regard to the amount of discretion vested in
the agency by the statute. To discern the congressional intent one
needed only to look to the legislative history of the Act. Assuming
Congress was aware of the existence of such statutes at the time the
FOIA was enacted, "[i]f Congress had not' intended to include [a
particular] statute within Exemption Three, it could easily have done so
either by explicitly narrowing the coverage of the exemption or by
amending" the statute in question. 175 Clearly this construction is the
broadest of the three interpretations which had been suggested prior to
Robertson, since it clearly rejects the notion that the FOIA can be read
in any sense as repealing or modifying by implication a statute authoriz-
ing nondisclosure which existed prior to the enactment of the FOIA.
The construction of exemption 3 adopted by the Court in Robert-
son is similar in both theory and consequence to the broad construction
advanced by Judge MacKinnon. The plaintiffs in Robertson sought
certain documents which contained information gathered by the Federal
Aviation Administration on the commercial airlines.' 76  The FAA de-
nied the requests on the ground that the documents were protected by
170. California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1974).
171. Id.; see FOIA Developments 435-36.
172. 505 F.2d at 768.
173. Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting), construing 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1970).
174. 498 F.2d at 1015-16.
175. Id.
176. 422 U.S. at 256-57. Specifically the documents requested were known as
Systems Worthiness Analysis Program Reports (SWAP). Id. They contained analyses
made by the FAA of the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines.
Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1970).
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section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act,1 7 which permits the FAA
Administrator to withhold information the disclosure of which, in his
judgment, is not required in the public interest. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit, applying the narrowest of the three interpretations described
above, held the statutory exemption inapplicable because section 1104
did not specify or categorize the documents it authorized to be with-
held. ' In reversing this holding, the Supreme Court noted that the
language of the exemption itself was ambiguous 79 and that it could find
no support in the legislative history of the Act to justify the narrow
construction adopted by the lower court: "No distinction seems to have
been made on the basis of the standards articulated in the exempting
statute or on the degree of discretion which it vested in a particular
Government officer."' 80 Instead, taking the type of approach suggested
by Judge MacKinnon, the Court looked to the legislative history of the
FOIA in order to discover whether Congress intended statutes like
section 1104 to come within exemption 3.11
In the Court's view, the answer to this inquiry was clear. Not only
was Congress aware of section 1104 and similar statutes at the time the
FOIA was being considered,18 2 but there was also express evidence that
Congress did not intend to modify them through the enactment of the
FOIA. 183  Furthermore, to hold that material falling within section
1104 did not come within the statutory exemption would have been, in
effect, to read the FOIA as having repealed "by implication all existing
177. Federal Aviation Act § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970):
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of in-
formation contained in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter or of information obtained by the Board or the
Administrator... stating the grounds for such objection. Whenever such ob-
jection is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information with-
held from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such infor-
mation would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required
in the interest of the public ....
178. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Indeed even under
the broader construction urged by the court in California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1974), it is clear that documents covered by section 1104 would not come
within exemption 3 because the statute merely permits the administrator to exercise his
discretion to withhold the information. FOIA Developments 437 n.98.
179. 422 U.S. at 262-63.
180. Id. at 263-64.
181. Id. at 263-65.
182. Id. at 264, citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1963)
(statement of Sen. Long).
183. 422 U.S. at 265, citing H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966)
(noting numerous statutes restricting public access to agency records and asserting that
these statutes would not be modified by the proposed legislation).
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statutes 'which restrict public access to specific public records.' "184 The
Court did not attribute to Congress any such intent and, absent "'a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,'" held the
material in question to be exempt from disclosure. 185
Although the particular arguments adduced by the Court clearly
support its holding, which gives the exemption its broadest possible
construction, the ultimate effects of the decision arguably comport
neither with the express language of the FOIA nor with the general
disclosure policy of the statute. 186  The problem is that there are scores
of statutes like section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act which, if given
similar effect pursuant to exemption 3, will leave virtually unrestrained
discretion in government bureaucrats to withhold information which
would otherwise have to be disclosed under the FOIA. 187 The words of
implementation may be different but the end result is precisely that
reached under the old Administrative Procedure Act in every case
controlled by the statutory exemption.18 8
184. There was simply no evidence that Congress "intended to repeal, by implication
alone, those statutes that make disclosure a matter of agency discretion. It simply is
impossible fairly to discern any such intention on the part of Congress." 422 U.S. at
269 (Stewart, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 266, quoting Regional Rail Reorganizational Cases, 419 U.S. 103 (1974).
This interpretation of "specifically" in exemption 3 parallels the Court's previous
construction of "specifically" in exemption 1 of the Act prior to the 1974 amendments.
See FOIA Developments 434 n.83. At that time, exemption 1 exempted from the Act
matters "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970). The only matter to
be determined by a court under that exemption was "whether in fact the President has
required by Executive Order that the documents in question are to be kept secret." EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 95 (1973) (Stewart, ., concurring). The only "specificity"
required was the broad executive order itself; there was no necessity for a specific order
to issue for each document which the executive desired to classify. Id. at 83. Similarly,
under exemption 3 the only "specificity" demanded is that there be a statute which
allows someone, under any criteria, to withhold information. If such a statute exists,
then exemption 3 will be applicable "regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or
inadvertent the enactment might be." Id. at 95 n. (Stewart, J., concurring).
186. The Court itself was fully cognizant of the tension between its interpretation of
exemption 3 and the ultimate goal of the Act when it sanguinely noted that there was no
"inevitable inconsistency between the general congressional intent to replace the broad
standard of the former Administrative Procedure Act and its intent to preserve, for air
transportation regulation, a broad degree of discretion on what information is to be
protected in the public interest. . . ." 422 U.S. at 266.
187. Professor Davis cites one lengthy compilation of such statutes published in 1960.
Davis, supra note 53, at 786, citing SPECuAL SUBcoMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFoRMATON
OF THE HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL
STATUTES ON THE AvAILABiLrrY oF INFORMATION (Comm. Print 1960).
188. Two lower courts also dealt with exemption 3 issues in 1975. In Parker v.
EEOC, 36 AD. L.2D 1074 (D.D.C. 1975), the issue presented did not directly involve the
scope of exemption 3; rather it was whether certain documents which reflected settlemeni
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THE INVESTIGATORY RECORDS EXEMPTION
Of the two exemptions substantively amended in 1974, only the
seventh exemption, which excludes from mandatory disclosure "investi-
gatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" in specified
situations, 189 received judicial scrutiny in 1975.190 The obvious ques-
of discrimination charges prior to any court action constituted "informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion" which by statute could not be made public by
the Commission without the consent of the persons concerned. Id. at 1076, quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970). The documents sought by the FOIA plaintiff represented
agreements between the EEOC, the person filing the discrimination cbmplaints, and
employers and labor organizations. One class of documents, "pre-determination settle-
ments," were settlement agreements entered into after a charge was filed but before any
determination of reasonable cause by the Commission. A second class, "conciliation
agreements," were settlements entered into after a determination of reasonable cause. 36
AD. L.2D at 1074-75. The court held that both classes of documents were "informal"
methods under the statute and thus within exemption 3. Id. at 1077. Assuming the
proper classification of the documents in the first instance, the result reached in Parker is
well within even the narrowest interpretation of exemption 3.
In Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
772 (1976), the issue again was not the scope of exemption 3, but instead whether the
documents requested were within the scope of a withholding statute which qualified
under exemption 3. The materials sought from the IRS were unpublished private and
letter rulings relating to the manufacturers' excise tax and the files underlying a number
of published Revenue Rulings. 522 F.2d at 286. The government invoked exemption 3
on grounds that the documents were exempt pursuant to sections 6103 and 7213 of the
Internal Revenue Code. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6103, 7213. Since the district
court had ordered disclosure with the right reserved to review the documents in camera
and to deny disclosure of any specific document in which the "deletion of protected mat-
ter will not suffice to preserve any exemption which may be validly asserted with respect
thereto," 522 F.2d at 287, and because the circuit court had not itself examined the
documents in camera, id. at 288, the only question presented was whether the requested
materials were clearly "returns" within the meaning of section 6103.
The court held that the letter rulings were not returns within the meaning of section
6103. Id. at 289. Significant here is that the court did not follow a Treasury Regulation
which contained a broad definition of a "return," Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-1(a) (3) (i)
(1972), and which would have covered some of the letter rulings at issue. "mhe
regulations, promulgated by the regulated agency, 'cannot immunize letter rulings from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act' beyond that which Congress intended
to protect under § 6103." 522 F.2d at 289, quoting Tax Analysts and Advocates v. IRS,
505 F.2d 350, 354 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A different result is not mandated by
Robertson, since it is clear that had the documents come within the scope of section 6103
they would have been specifically exempt. The dispute concerns the scope of the
withholding statute which requires inquiry into the intent of Congress and not the intent
of the IRS which has no power to expand the scope of the withholding statute.
189. Prior to amendment, exemption 7 protected "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970). The newly amended exemption protects:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with en-
forcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a
Vol. 1976:366]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tions which the courts were required to address in applying this exemp-
tion were to what extent Congress intended the amendments to change
prior judicial interpretations of the provision and to modify prior judi-
cial approaches to the issues arising under it. The quality of the
answers given by the courts to these questions varied rather noticeably.
Some courts seemed unwilling to come to terms with the amendments or
to adequately take into account the congressional intent underlying
them, while other courts attached greater importance to the new lan-
guage of the exemption, from both a substantive and a philosophical
point of view. The purpose of this section is to examine these new
developments in an attempt to delineate some guidelines for future
application of the exemption.
Prior to amendment, the exemption covered investigatory files
"except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency." ' The courts construed this single limitation narrowly, and as
one commentator has concluded, "[i]n practice, files labeled as investi-
gatory became exempt, and it had become practically impossible to
challenge the classification as unjustified under the purpose of the ex-
emption.' ' 2
In general, the 1974 amendments specifically delineate the only
situations in which the exemption does apply, thus completely reversing
the thrust of the exemption. As explained by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,19 3 the purpose of the amendments was
to
limit application of Exemption 7 to agency records so that it would
apply only to the extent that "the production of such records would inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings, deprive a person of a right to a
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, constitute [an] ... unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, disclose the identity of an informer, or
disclose investigative techniques and procedures."' 94
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confi-
dential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) en-
danger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(b) (7) (Supp. 1976).
190. The other exemption amended in 1974 was exemption 1, the executive order
exemption. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. 1976).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970), as amended 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (Supp.
1976).
192. Clark, supra note 63 at 761-62.
193. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
194. Id. at 164-65, quoting S. CoNrr. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1974).
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Furthermore, not only do the amendments specifically describe the
situations in which application of the exemption is appropriate, but they
also make it clear that the burden is on the agency invoking the
exemption to show that the disclosure of a document would "cause the
government harm in one of the areas set out in the statute."195
This emphasis on the limited number of justifications which an
agency can make in order to invoke the exemption, plus the insistence
that the agency prove that a particular justification exists for each record
for which the exemption is claimed, are evident in one line of 1975 cases
construing exemption 7. In a second line of cases, however, the courts
failed to give adequate weight to these new points of emphasis in their
analyses under the exemption, thus reaching inconsistent and arguably
incorrect results.
The proper application of the amended exemption is illustrated by
Kaminer v. NLRB,'96 in which two of the specifically enumerated
justifications were applied. The case arose out of a labor dispute. Upon
receipt of an unfair labor practice charge by a union, the NLRB
conducted its usual investigation, interviewing witnesses and taking
affidavits. Before the Board could act on the results of this investiga-
tion, however, the union requested and received permission to withdraw
the charges. The union subsequently filed a civil suit against the
employer involved in the dispute, who, in turn, brought an action under
the FOIA against the NLRB to obtain the affidavits which had been
taken by the Board or its agents in the course of their investigation.' 97
The government invoked subsections (A), (C) and (D) of exemption
7 to justify refusing the request.'
The court, in construing exemption 7(A) which protects investiga-
tory records to the extent that their production would "interfere with
enforcement proceedings," cited a portion of the legislative debate on
the exemption to the effect that it "should apply only when 'the Govern-
ment's case in court. . . would be harmed by the premature release of
evidence . . .' or where disclosure would 'harm such proceedings by
impeding any necessary investigation before the proceeding.' "190 Be-
195. Clark, supra note 63, at 762. "The legislative history [of exemption 7 as
amended] clearly indicates that Congress disapproves of those cases . . . which relieve
the Government of the obligation to show that disclosure of a particular investigatory
file would contravene the purposes of Exemption 7." N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. at 164, citing S. CoNF. Rnp. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
196. 37 AD. L.2D 4Z (S.D. Miss. 1975).
197. Id. at 422.
198. Id. at 423. See note 189 supra.
199. Id., quoting 120 CONG. REc. 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator
Hart).
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cause the Board's file in the case had already been closed, there was
simply "no possibility of future enforcement proceedings and exemption
7(A) does not apply. '200  On the other hand, the court found exemp-
tion 7(D), which provides for the protection of the identity of "confi-
dential source[s]," to be applicable to the documents in question. The
court agreed that the term "confidential source" was meant to encom-
pass the identity of all persons giving information "under an expressed
assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an
assurance could be reasonably inferred."' 201  Though no express prom-
ise of confidentiality had been given to the sources, such a promise was
"clearly inferred in this case" from the very nature of the Board's
"investigatory function" which required confidentiality. 20 2
Another case which clearly follows the legislative mandate of the
amendments by adopting a particularized approach to the investigatory
files exemption is Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash.0 3 In this case, the
NLRB contended that exemption 7(Q, which covers "investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that
disclosure would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy,"204 gave it the authority to withhold certain documents relating to a
pending back pay proceeding.205 The court agreed that the claim of
exemption was valid. In its investigation of the scope of subsection
(C), the court looked to the personnel files exemption for guidance 08
since the operative standards in the two provisions are nearly identical.
It noted that exemption 7(C) differed only in that the word "clearly"
had been omitted. The court intepreted this "purposeful omission" in
the investigatory records exemption as evidencing a congressional intent
to grant "agencies broader license to withhold documents than does [the
200. 37 AD, L.2D at 423.
201. Id. at 424, quoting CoNv. REP. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). See
120 CONG. REC. 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart). For a case
refusing to find an implied assurance of confidentiality see Deering Milliken, Inc. v.
Nash, 37 AD. L.2D 933, 946 (D.S.C. 1975), discussed at notes 203-208 infra and
accompanying text and at note 231 infra.
202. 37 AD. L.2D at 424. The court also noted that exemption 7(D) was not
absolute. Consequently any "reasonably segregable portion" of the affidavits sought had
to be disclosed after deletions of material which would disclose the identity of the
Board's informants. Id. at 425.
203. 37 An. L.2D 933 (D.S.C. 1975).
204. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b,)(7)(C) (Supp. 1976).
205. 37 An. L.2D at 949.
206. Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), covers "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."
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personnel files exemption]." 2°7 Although it did not decide how "un-
warranted [an] invasion of personal privacy" must be to trigger exemp-
tion 7, the court quite logically concluded that the cases arising under
the personnel files exemption could be relied on to the extent that any
document which was covered by that exemption would also fall within
the broader proscription of exemption 7. After examining these cases,
the court concluded that the documents in question were covered by the
personnel files exemption, and thus were also exempt under subsection
(C) of the investigatory records exemption. 0 8
Other cases in which the newly amended exemption was properly
applied emphasize the point that the burden of proof under the investi-
gatory records exemption is now clearly on the agency invoking the
provision. For example, in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB,2 °9 the gov-
ernment invoked the seventh exemption on the ground that disclosure of
certain signed affidavits or written reports which had been prepared by
the Board from interviews of witnesses for a pending unfair labor
practice proceeding would interfere with the agency's future enforce-
ment proceedings. Specifically, the NLRB claimed that the effect of
disclosure would be to reduce its ability to obtain information from the
public in future investigations since prospective witnesses would be
reluctant to volunteer information because of the publicity. The court
rejected this argument, holding that "these general contentions are
insufficient under the amended exemption." 210  The government had
simply not sustained its burden to prove any of the specific types
of interference.2 1  Similarly, the court in Cessna Aircraft Co. v.
207. 37 AD. L.2D at 950.
208. Id. at 951. Elements of exemption 6 analysis are also relevant to the exemption
7(C) issue of what factors a court must weigh in deciding whether an invasion of
privacy is unwarranted. As under the personnel files exemption, the question of whose
interests must be evaluated in making this decision arises under 7(C). Applying
exemption 6 analysis, the court in Deering Milliken assumed that a balancing test was
appropriate, although it refused to consider the individual FOIA plaintiff's need for the
information. Rather, adopting the position advanced in some cases interpreting exemp-
tion 6 which emphasized the need to divorce access to government information from
individualized need, the court asserted that it would look only to the general public's
interest in the disclosure of the information in making its determination of whether the
resulting invasion of privacy would be "unwarranted." Id. at 953.
209. 37 AD. L2D 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Other aspects of this case are discussed in
notes 153-64 supra and accompanying text.
210. Id. at 691. The court noted that the purpose of the amendments was "to limit
the exemption to instances where disclosure would interfere with one of a specific set of
interests" and that the court in order to achieve this "must examine each situation
individually and determine if any of the specific harms enumerated by the statute would
result from disclosure." Id.; accord, NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 37 AD. L.2
1074, 1076-77 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
211. 37 AD. L.2D at 692. The court concluded that the only way the release of the
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NLRB21 2 thought that the government was presenting an overbroad
assertion of the exemption, observing that "It]he Board ... may not
avoid the consequences of the [FOIA] by simply asserting that the
requested documents are all subject to exemption. '218
In two other 1975 eases the courts appeared not to follow the
mandate of the newly amended exemption. Russell Stover Candies,
Inc. v. NLRB2 4 involved a dispute concerning an NLRB certification
proceeding. After the employees at one of its plants had elected a
particular union as their bargaining agent, the employer filed objections
to the election with the Board. The Regional Director conducted the
required investigation and filed a report overruling all the objections.
Subsequently, the employer brought an action under the FOIA to obtain
certain witness statements and affidavits and all names and statements of
persons involved in the investigation. In a truncated opinion, the court
held that this information was privileged pursuant to exemption 7,
finding that an earlier case, Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 was
dispositive of all the issues.2"' In Wellman, the court had denied access
under the FOIA to affidavits obtained by an NLRB investigator during
an investigation of a union representation election. The court had based
this holding on the ground that disclosure of an employee's statements
would inhibit future Board investigations and that premature disclosure
of the investigation reports would prevent the Board from presenting its
strongest case. 217
The problem with the court's approach in Russell Stover Candies is
that it ignored the legislative mandate embodied in the 1974 amend-
information could hurt enforcement proceedings is that the FOIA plaintiff, also a party
to an NLRB action, would be able to determine whether any of the material contained in
the requested documents supported its contentions in the labor case. "This value is
precisely that which is contemplated by the Freedom of Information Act and is not
restricted by the exemptions of the Act." Id.
In NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 37 A. L.2D) 1074 ,(W.D. Tenn. 1975), the
government sought to withhold affidavits of prospective government witnesses in an
unfair labor practice hearing under the investigatory records exemption. In denying the
government's motion for summary judgment, the court stressed that the government had
failed to sustain the burden of proof mandated by the amended exemption. Id. at 1076-
77. The Hardeman court expressly approved the court's analysis in Title Guarantee
concerning the effect of the amendments to exemption 7. Id.
212. 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975).
213. Id. at 1047. "Blanket assertions of privilege and exemption are not to be
rubber-stamped by court approval, and . . . the agency will be required to assume its
burden of proof that a withheld document is covered by specific statutory exemption." Id.
at 1049.
214. 37 AD. L.2D 35 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
215. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974).
216. 37 AD. L.2D at 36.
217. 490 F.2d at 431.
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ments that agencies justify nondisclosure in terms of one of the situa-
tions specifically enumerated in the amended exemption. From the
citation to Wellman one may infer that subsection (A) of exemption 7,
which applies when release would "interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings," is the basis of the decision. Yet there are other subsections which
arguably may be applicable, and it is impossible to know for sure on
which of these provisions the court relied. 218
The other 1975 case in which the court apparently ignored the
mandate of the 1974 amendments is Climax Molybdenum Co. v.
NLRB. 219  This case also involved a labor dispute in which the NLRB
had scheduled a hearing to examine charges that an employer had
committed unfair labor practices. Prior to the hearing, the employer
brought an action to obtain various statements, notes, memoranda, and
other records of information taken from witnesses interviewed by the
NLRB in the course of its investigation into the charges. The NLRB
claimed that exemption 7(A) was applicable and moved for summary
judgment, 220 apparently without making any effort to show why the
particular documents should come within the exemption. The employ-
er, on the other hand, argued "that because the FOIA. . .places the
burden of establishing the exemption on the agency, the NLRB is
required to produce evidence to show that in this particular case the
requested disclosure would interfere with the specific enforcement pro-
ceeding involved. '2 1 Remarkably, the court rejected plaintiff's propo-
sition and held exemption 7(A) applicable as a matter of law to the
documents requested, irrespective of whether their disclosure would
actually have interfered with law enforcement proceedings. 2
2
The court adopted an unprecedented analysis to support this hold-
ing in the face of the newly amended exemption. The FOIA, the court
argued, has to be construed in conjunction with other federal statutes. In
this case, the other statute was the National Labor Relations Act, which
has a "clearly defined policy of establishing the [NLRB] as the primary
218. One district court has indicated that it would not rely on Wellman to decide
issues which arise under the newly amended investigatory files exemption. NLIB v.
Hardeman Garment Corp., 37 AD. L.21 1074, 1076 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (holding that
the government had not sustained its burden of proof under exemption 7 and thus
denying government motion for summary judgment).
219. 37 Ai. L.2D 956 (D. Colo. 1975).
220. Id. at 957.
221. Id.
222. Id. Evidently' the court was creating an irrebuttable presumption that disclosure
of this type of information, gathered for this particular type of law enforcement purpose,
necessarily would interfere with the enforcement proceedings.
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national governmental agency in the area of labor-management law. 223
The NLRB has the power to prevent unfair labor practices, and is
"expressly authorized to establish its own" enforcement procedures in
exercising this power. Further, the Board has the authority to prevent
discovery in advance of an unfair labor practice hearing.22 4 Therefore,
"[t]o hold that there should be no judicial intrusion into the Board's
determination that disclosure of its investigatory files would interfere
with the enforcement proceeding relevant in this case is a consistent
application of the policy expressed in the labor statute. 225 In addition,
the court argued, to make the NLRB show in every case how the
disclosure of particular documents would impinge on the interests pro-
tected by exemption 7(A) "would impose an intolerable burden on the
federal district courts" by encouraging all parties to an NLRB investiga-
tion to institute FOIA actions to seek discovery.228
The effect of the holding in Climax Molybdenum Co. is to make
conclusive the NLRB's determination that disclosure of any investigato-
ry file pertaining to an unfair labor practice hearing would interfere with
enforcement proceedings. Under this analysis the Board would become
the final arbiter of the FOlT issue. However, there are several prob-
lems with the court's analysis of the new exemption 7(A) and the
statute in general. In the first place, the court apparently ignored the
Supreme Court's admonition that the legislative history of exemption 7
"clearly indicates that Congress disapproves of those cases. . . which
relieve the Government of tie obligation to show that disclosure of a
particular investigatory file would contravene the purposes of Exemp-
tion 7. ''227 In addition, by accepting the NLRB's determination as
conclusive, the court seems to have disregarded the express language of
the FOIA which gives the federal district courts jurisdiction to order the
production of agency records improperly withheld. The Act specifically
provides that on complaint of a party seeking disclosure "the court shall
determine the matter de novo. . . and the burden is on the agency to
sustain its action" under any of the exemptions.228 Clearly the result
reached by the court flies in the face of this explicit language.
223. Id.
224. id. at 958, citing NLRB v. Automotive Textile Prods. Co., 422 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 405-07 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Raser Tanning Corp. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 80, 81-83 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960).
225. 37 AD. L.2D at 958.
226. Id.
227. N.L.R.B .v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 164 (1975).
228. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (4) (B) (Supp. 1976).
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Furthermore, the court's argument that it would place an "intolera-
ble burden" on the district courts to require a particularized inquiry in
every case into whether disclosure would interfere with the specific
enforcement proceeding involved is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is
incorrect because there is no reason to suppose, assuming an increased
number of FOIA requests as a result of a revitalized seventh exemption,
that these requests will result in an avalanche of lawsuits brought
pursuant to the Act if the agency processes them in good faith. The
court has obviously lost sight of the fact that a lawsuit is not the primary
mode. of pressing a claim under the FOIA. Further, the argument is
irrelevant for two reasons. First, the FOIA permits "any person" to
obtain information under the Act, regardless of purpose.129  Second,
since Congress has chosen to impose the burden of the FOIA litigation
on the district courts,230 it would seem as though the extent of that
burden should not enter into the determination of what Congress intend-
ed by a particular provision of the Act.
In the final analysis the Climax Molybdenum Co. court's holding
seems to rest on some rather vague notion that the same statutory
policies which justify the NLRB in refusing to allow pre-hearing discov-
ery also justify nondisclosure under exemption 7(A) of the FOIA and
thus make the Board's determination of the issue unreviewable. That
contention, as has been suggested, receives no support from the lan-
guage of the FOIA as the court itself must have known, since it cited no
language to support its construction. Furthermore, to import the policy
of unrelated statutes into an exemption would not seem to comport with
the express provision in the Act that the exemption section "does not
authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records
to the public, except as specifically stated in this section." ''2 l
229. Id. § 552(a) (3).
230. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
231. Id. § 552(c). If there were any statutes actually authorizing or permitting the
NLRB to withhold the information then the statutory exemption, id. § 552(b) (3), would
be applicable. This situation is the only one in which other federal statutes should be
considered in deciding whether to compel disclosure.
The proper application of exemption 7(A) in an analogous situation is exemplified
by Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 37 Ai. L.2D 933 (D.S.C. 1975). In that case the
FOIA plaintiff requested that the NLRB disclose certain documents generated in
preparation for a back pay hearing which the Board was shortly to conduct. The Board
refused, claiming that exemption 7(A) protected all the documentg sought. Id. at 937.
The issue, as the court noted, was whether or not this particular back pay proceeding
would be "interfered with" by production of the requested documents. Id. at 941. The
NLRB contended, as it had in Climax Molybdenum Co., "that (7) (A) exempts from
production the documents in question here simply because they would not be discovera-
ble under the current procedures employed in NLRB hearings." Id. at 944. The court
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rejected this construction on the ground that it was "totally inconsistent with the policy
of the 1974 amendments to exempt NLRB files solely because the Board's own
regulations would not allow their discovery in an NLRB proceeding." Id. That policy
"was to compel any government agency withholding documents to justify that action by
establishing specifically the manner in which production of the documents would harm
one or more of several enumerated interests." Id. Further the court stated that "[iun
determining whether or not the information to be released will interfere with a law
enforcement proceeding it is only relevant to make such determination in the context of
the particular enforcement proceeding." Id. at 943, quoting 120 CONG. REc. 9329-30
(daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart). Thus, the fact that the Board
itself does not allow discovery cannot preclude a court from examining whether disclo-
sure under exemption 7(A) would interfere with enforcement proceedings.
The NLRB also argued as a slight variation of the reasoning just discussed that
because the documents sought would not normally be discoverable, their production
under the FOIA should itself be presumed to interfere with enforcement proceedings
without a more specific showing. Needless to say, the court rejected "[sluch a
conclusion [because it] . . . would represent the wooden and mechanical application of
the FOI Act which Congress sought to eliminate" in the 1974 amendments. 37 A. L.2
at 945. The court refused to abdicate its responsibility under the Act "to determine
whether the NLRB has proved the applicability of the exemptions it claims. . . ." Id.
The court went on to find that in this particular case the NLRB could not possibly
have made a showing of interference with the back pay proceeding involved sufficient to
invoke exemption 7(A). The court reached this conclusion 'by considering both the
nature of the documents sought and the nature of the proceeding. In the first place, the
documents related solely to the issue of the amount of back pay owed by the employer to
certain former employees. The Board had no authority to exact any punitive damages.
Thus the nature of the proceeding was remedial and compensatory, its purpose being to
determine objectively the amount of back pay owed by the employer. Assuming the
documents sought related to this issue the only use they could have had would be to en-
able the employer to contest the accuracy of the amount of pay which the Board asserted
that it owed. This could not interfere with a proceeding the very purpose of which was
to objectively determine that very amount. Id.
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